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Abstract 
 
Following the Great War, ethnolinguistic nationalism became the 
basis of nation-state building and statehood legitimation in 
Central Europe. According to this paradigm, for the nation-state 
to be legitimate, it must house a single nation only, defined 
through its unique language that also serves as this polity’s sole 
national and official language. The language cannot be shared 
with any other states, and no additional languages can be 
employed in official capacity on the nation-state’s territory. 
Initially, I thought that this unique normative isomorphism of 
language, nation, and state was specific exclusively to Central 
Europe. But scanning the language policies of today’s extant 
states, I discovered that another cluster of ‘isomorphic polities’ 
exists in East and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam). This raises an interesting 
question of whether it is a local development, or maybe a transfer 
of ideas took place in this respect between (Central) Europe and 
this region. 
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Introduction 
 
Nations, languages or states are so much part and parcel of the 
world in which people live nowadays that most of us hardly ever 
spare them a thought. These categories appear ‘transparent’ to 
us, the ‘natural’ building blocks2 from which our (social) world is 
composed, or – more aptly – constructed (cf Searle 1995).  
Scholarly literature frequently suggests that a configuration of the 
three elements is the cornerstone of nationalism, that is, the sole 
ideology of statehood and peoplehood legitimation in today’s 
world after the decolonization and the breakup of the non-
national polity of the Soviet Union during the second half of the 
20th century. From the human perspective, today’s world is made 
of nation-states; all the planet’s inhabited and habitable landmass 
neatly apportioned among the extant polities. 
 
In the article, first, I aspire to ‘de-naturalize’ the categories of 
nation, [a] language3 and state (but I exclude from the analysis 
substate, suprastate, or ‘not-state-endowed’ nations and 
nationalisms). On this basis, I reflect on ethnic nationalism as a 
subspecies of the ideology of nationalism. According to many 
authorities, ethnic nationalism is quite closely, though in a largely 
undefined and vague manner, associated with Central (and 
Eastern) Europe (cf Plamenatz 1973). In this pattern of thinking, 
the importance of language is customarily emphasized, often by 
reference to the pre-national East Prussian scholar based in 
Russia’s Livonia, Johann Gottfried Herder’s, seminal but rather 
rambling work, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit, 1784-91 (Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of 
                                                          
2 Even some renowned thinkers, for instance philosopher Leszek Kołakowski, fall for the 
deceptive appearances and seriously claim, for instance, that nations are products of nature 
(Kołakowski 1999: 65). 
3 I use the cumbersome expression ‘a language’ to denote the meaning ‘one of the many 
languages’ in order to make readers aware that I am not speaking of ‘language’ in general. 
The former is a man-made construct, an artifact of culture, while the latter belongs to the 
sphere of nature. The capacity for language is biologically hard-wired into humans by 
evolution. In German, this distinction between ‘a language’ and ‘language’ is usefully 
mapped out by two distinctive terms Einzelsprache and Sprache. My focus is on the former, 
that is, on Einzelsprachen. 
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Man, 1800) (cf Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1997: 69; Greenfeld 
1992: 189-395; Hobsbawm 1990: 80-162; Kedourie 1993: 52-
53; Kohn 1944: 427; Smith 1986: 171). Yet, it is not to deny 
that later national activists and thinkers, again, especially in 
Central Europe, did use some of Herder’s ideas for postulating 
and pursuing their pet national projects (Sundhaußen 1973). 
 
However, the exact features of the three aforementioned 
categories and the relation(s) among them are rarely elaborated 
on in any systematic manner. The intuition about the presumed 
importance of languages in ethnic nationalism (that verges on 
being a kind of unanalyzable tacit knowledge [cf Polanyi 1966: 3-
25]) does not yield any analytical insight beyond drawing 
examples from Central (and Eastern) Europe and proposing, 
mostly on this unrepresentative sample, generalizations on 
(ethnic) nationalism as a global ideology (cf Chlebowczyk 1980; 
Gellner 1997: 52-58; Hroch 1985; Kohn 1944: 497-572). Hence, 
for the sake of clarity and to avoid confusion, I propose to speak 
consistently of ‘ethnolinguistic nationalism’ when referring to this 
type of national ideology whose cornerstone is a language. 
 
Second, and most importantly, there is no clear-cut definition of 
what ethnolinguistic nationalism is, differences being often vast 
among specific cases of nation-states that employ this ideology or 
its elements perhaps. Authors, by basing their definitions on this 
or that nation-state, by default exclude cases of other national 
polities from the remit of their pet definitions. In such a situation, 
it appears that the best course of action is to come up with a 
definition that is deduced from the observed practices of how 
ethnolinguistic nationalism is actually implemented. In turn, in a 
heuristic manner, the geographical spread of the aforesaid 
practices may be postulated to be coterminous with Central 
Europe, or more exactly, with the area where the region is 
believed to be located.  
 
Third, an analytical instrument (that is, the ‘normative 
isomorphism of language, nation and state’) for deciding whether 
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or not this or that nationalism of a given nation-state is of 
ethnolinguistic character, should enable researchers to attain a 
higher degree of exactness in their pronouncements, making their 
findings comparable on a formalized footing. Personally, I believe 
that Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalisms are a somewhat 
oddball case, from which it may be altogether erroneous to 
generalize about all other nationalisms extant across the globe.  
 
Finally, and most importantly for this article, in the conclusion, I 
propose that at present there are two clusters of ethnolinguistic 
(isomorphic) nation-states on Earth, namely, one in Central 
Europe and another in East and Southeast Asia. I reflect on what 
it may entail and how possible ideological links and potential 
transfers of ideas and political know-how between the two 
regions could be researched. 
 
 
The Categories of Nation, [a] Language and State 
 
The concepts ‘nation,’ ‘[a] language’ and ‘state,’ interlocked with 
one another, are synonymous with (Westerno-centric) modernity, 
with the socio-political order of the world in which we live at the 
beginning of the 21st century. But not long ago, in the mid-19th 
century, these concepts were unknown to most humans. Indeed, 
the West (or more exactly, a handful of Western European 
powers, together with Russia) had gradually dominated much of 
the globe since the 16th century. But this domination was not 
absolute, as such important non-Western regional powers as the 
Ottoman Empire, the Mughal Empire or China continued to be 
reckoned with. Likewise, much of the inhabited and habitable 
territory stayed outside the reach and control of the Western and 
non-Western polities. 
 
States 
 
The phenomenon is best observed on European maps of Africa 
before the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) opened a ‘scramble’ for 
5 
 
this continent. Earlier, European colonizers had kept to the 
coastal areas, leaving the African interior to its own devices, and 
proclaiming that the sub-Saharan section of the continent 
contained ‘no native state organisms’ (cf Engel 1967: 136-137). 
That was typical of the European (Western) perception of the 
state of matters political in Africa. In reality, humans always – 
and in this case, naturally (the Homo sapiens sapiens being a par 
excellence social species) – live in groups and in one way or 
another develop a ‘socio-political’ organization that prevails within 
a given territory, which is a basic definition of what statehood is 
about (cf Dunbar 1993). 
 
For instance, in Europe, statehood is recognized in the case of the 
Vatican City State with the population of a mere 800 living on the 
territory of less than half a square kilometer. Likewise, 
Liechtenstein and Monaco with the populations of 35,000 each, 
the former enjoying the territory of 160 sq km, while the latter 
squeezed to the area of 2 sq km, are not denied the status of 
state. But in reality all the three examples are not that different, 
in populace or territory, from an average pre-colonial village or a 
lineage group led by a headperson in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Tymowski 1999). 
 
It appears that human groups up to about 150 members are 
genuinely ‘natural,’ coalescing and maintained spontaneously 
thanks to what the humanity is as a species from a biological and 
evolutionary perspective. The threshold of 150 people in a group 
is generally thought to be the maximum number of persons one 
can reasonably maintain face-to-face contact with on a regular 
basis (cf Dunbar 1992). Beyond that all human groups, including 
those coterminous or contained within states are constructed, 
‘invented,’ or in other words, ‘imagined’ into being. When in 
larger groups it is impossible for all the members to have face-to-
face contact with one another, the commonality of the group has 
to be actively ‘imagined’ in order to maintain the group’s cohesion 
(cf Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Additionally, 
the type of state, which is nowadays considered to be ‘normal,’ is 
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that of ‘sovereign territorial polity’ (cf Pierson 1996). It was 
conceived in the mid-17th-century Europe in the wake of the 
Thirty Years’ War that dramatically rearranged the basis of 
statehood and its legitimation (increasingly decoupled with 
religion) in Western and Central Europe (cf Meyn 1992). 
Afterwards, the European colonial empires spread this model of 
sovereign territorial state across the world (cf Tilly 1992), or 
rather imposed it from above and afar without much regard for 
local political traditions or wishes. The as yet not colonized 
polities – such as Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Siam (Thailand), China or 
Japan – had to reshape themselves in accordance with this model 
in order to survive as independent polities. By embarking on the 
course of such prescribed ‘modernization,’ the countries proved 
that they did not require any ‘civilizing’ (read ‘colonial 
annexation’) to be provided by a Western empire (cf Winichakul 
1994). Not that Western powers did genuinely wish to support 
such reforms and observe the sovereignty of these non-Western 
polities. That is why, China was carved into imperial spheres of 
influence, parts of the territory of Siam seized by France, or 
Abyssinia annexed by Italy. 
 
The resulting uniformization (standardization) of statehood 
organization across the entire globe is as much a Western 
imposition as a Western invention, not a product of nature (cf 
Streckfuss 1993). 
 
Nations 
 
The American and French revolutions did away with the divine 
legitimation of rule transferring this role to a given polity’s 
(ideally, entire) population, renamed in this function as ‘nation.’ 
The subsequent coupling of the nation, seen as ‘content,’ with the 
sovereign territorial state, playing the role of the national 
content’s spatial ‘container’ (or a set of territorially specific 
principles that spawn and maintain a polity) gave rise to the 
nation-state. Nowadays, each polity (with the rare exception of 
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the Vatican City State) in order to be seen as legitimate must be 
a nation-state, or in other words, a state for one nation only. 
 
In this insistence, nationalism became the first-ever 
‘infrastructural’ ideology of the entire human world. The stunning 
normative success of this ideology, accepted at present quite 
unquestioningly by all as ‘normal,’ created a standardized arena 
into which human relations are simultaneously channeled and at 
which they are played out. Ideally, this ‘playing out’ of the 
relations ought to happen among states and within them. 
(Perhaps, that is why non-territorial political-cum-religious 
groupings, such as Al-Qaeda, are so much vilified and battled 
against because they neither accept the shape of the arena nor 
follow its organizational principles.) 
 
In the collocation ‘nation-state,’ researchers agree on the basic 
definition of the latter element, but hold varying opinions on what 
the nation may be. Authorities, and among them, equally, 
scholars and politicians, differ widely in their definitions of what 
the ‘nation’ is or may be. The exasperation entailed by this 
inconclusive discussion on the subject is such that nowadays 
researchers propose to look beyond the very essentialism of 
defining ‘things’ or ‘entities,’ in order to transcend the ‘tyranny of 
groupism’ (cf Brubaker 2004: 11-18). However, the ‘groupness’ 
of human groups is a fact that is best acknowledged, and it is not 
beyond explication (cf Hill and Dunbar 2007; Lehmann, Korstjens 
and Dunbar 2007). The aforementioned difficulty lies in how the 
concept of nation is (ab)used in political and intellectual 
discourse.  
 
Quite unconsciously, we play all kinds of mind games with the 
term ‘nation,’ applying it (either as a group or its members) as 
we see fit and in line with this or that group’s interest, for so 
much is at stake, namely, (normatively legitimate) power itself. 
As mentioned above, ‘nation’ replaced god in the ultimate role of 
statehood legitimation. In this process, a bit of ‘divine mystery’ 
rubbed off onto the very concept of nation that replaced god in 
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this function. Dispelling this ‘civic mystery’ would disenchant 
state building and maintenance. This would be going a step too 
far, as such disenchantment would simultaneously shatter the 
rhetorical power of the word ‘nation’ which is badly needed for 
legitimating polities in the eyes of their inhabitants. Without this 
vague mystique of togetherness denoted by the term ‘nation,’ 
emotions and feelings are suddenly drained away from the 
concept of state, leaving it for what it is: an empty rhetorical 
shell, an abstract and arbitrary legal construct imposed on a 
population. The population in question, rebranded as ‘nation’ 
grows accustomed to this construct of state, and people learn to 
consider it as ‘their own,’ normal, and even ‘natural.’ As a result, 
a nation-state is born (if I am allowed to borrow this cliché 
straight from nationalist vocabulary). 
 
The difficulty of defining the term ‘nation’ lies in its arbitrary, 
diverse, vague and emotional (ab)use(s) and application(s). The 
11,000-strong Tuvaluans and the 1.4 billion Chinese are 
considered to be nations, which – as cloaked in the garb of their 
own national polities – enjoy the same rights and privileges in 
light of international law. The same distinction of a fully-fledged 
nation is accorded to the Americans (that is, United States 
citizens) with no national or official language in their polity of the 
United States of America, to the Poles with a single national and 
official language, and to the Indians with their (to-date) 23 
official languages (Constitutional Provisions 2014). But instead of 
trying to find some presumed ‘common core’ of meaning or ‘trait’ 
shared by all these groups going by the name of ‘nation’ in 
today’s world of nation-states, it may be more useful to propose 
that what makes a human group a nation is the successful 
application of the label ‘nation’ to it. When other human groups 
already enjoying the distinction of being ‘nations’ agree that an 
upstart group is a nation too, as it claims, such an aspirant group 
does become a nation, indeed. 
 
In accordance with the principles of the infrastructural ideology of 
nationalism, attaining the status of nation accords a group – 
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irrespective of its size, cohesion or any other characteristic – 
with, nowadays, the jealously guarded right to its own sovereign 
statehood. In the recent past, there were literally thousands of 
polities, for instance, almost 600 in the British India alone or 
even 5000 in the Holy Roman Empire (Hardgrave and Kochanek 
2008: 144; Köbler 1989: XIX). In the modern world the number 
of states, although continuing to grow at a glacial pace since the 
turn of the 20th century (when they numbered around 40), de 
facto, has been capped at around 200. This scarcity imbues the 
label of ‘nation’ with an unprecedented and unique political value. 
The globe sports thousands if not tens of thousands of human 
(usually ethnic) groups,4 but only a tiny fraction of them have 
achieved recognition as nations. The membership card of this 
genuinely exclusive club disproportionately empowers the very 
few vis-à-vis all the other human groups. 
 
Languages 
 
Like the model of sovereign territorial state and the ideology of 
nationalism, the term ‘nation’ is also of Western origin and 
making, which is readily visible in the Latin etymology of the 
word ultimately derived from the past participle of Latin nasci for 
‘to be born’ (Kemailainen 1964). This classical root delivered the 
European Medieval Latin term natio for denoting the totality of all 
the (male) members of a polity’s estates with an access to 
political decision-making (Hoad 1993: 309). Similarly, the English 
terms ‘state’ and ‘language’ are also derived from Latin5 (Hoad 
1989: 258, 459-460). The same is true of their counterparts in 
other European languages, though in some cases they may be 
more or less literal translations of the Latin(ate) words into these 
                                                          
4 Notwithstanding the lack of an agreed upon definition of what a language is, notionally, 
the number of ethnic groups can be proposed to be at least twice the number of the 7000 
odd ‘identified’ (or more aptly, recognized) languages (World 2014). 
5 The English term ‘state’ stems from the Latin noun statu for ‘position,’ in turn, formed 
from the verb stare ‘to stand.’ Likewise, English ‘language’ stems from the Latin noun lingua 
for ‘language,’ though its initial meaning was that of the body part of ‘tongue.’ 
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languages.6 Through the conduit of the colonial languages of the 
European imperial powers, the process repeated itself in the case 
of non-European languages (cf Li 2012) when the ‘norm’ of 
dividing the planet’s terra firma among states, and the humanity 
into nations with their specific languages was imposed on the rest 
of the world in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
 
Before the modern times, literacy having been limited to the 
narrow stratum of literati, people in Europe simply spoke to 
communicate. With the spread of education and literacy in the 
West among the population at large, suddenly it became 
apparent that communication between speakers was hardly 
possible unless prior to their conversation they agreed on ‘a 
language’ in which to talk (Billig 1995: 31). Speaking, or the 
linguistic – that by its nature is oral and continuous – in the 
process of modernization became discrete; the continuous 
linguistic partitioned into self-contained entities going by the 
generic name of ‘languages’ (that is, Einzelsprachen). 
 
This self-consciousness about talking in the artifacts of languages 
arose with the invention of writing and the possibility of detaching 
– in space and time – the utterance from the speaker and the 
interlocutor. Before the rise of writing both speaker and 
interlocutor had to be at the same time in the same place within 
each other’s earshot for an utterance to be successfully conveyed 
from one to the other. With the use of the proverbial pen and 
paper all the three (that is, speaker, interlocutor and utterance) 
may be disconnected in time and space, the previously necessary 
condition of simultaneous presence binding them replaced by a 
formalized ‘thing’ (that is, an artifact), or – in other words – a 
written language. This formalization allows writers to produce 
‘writings’ to be easily decodified by readers, as long as they are 
channeled through a given language, shared by both, in 
                                                          
6 For instance, naród, państwo and język for ‘nation,’ ‘state,’ and ‘language’ in Polish, 
formed, respectively, from the Polish verb rodzić ‘to give birth,’ from the Polish noun pan 
‘lord’ (which is also the source of the Polish verb panować ‘to rule’), and from the Polish 
noun język for the body part of ‘tongue.’ 
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accordance with the main principles of its formalization (Goody 
1986). Ever intensifying literacy, characteristic of modernity, 
spawned the ‘genre’ (or artifact) of standard language. The 
standard is a language whose principles have been meticulously 
described, streamlined and ‘normativized’ in usually state-
approved grammars, dictionaries and other official material and 
regulations (cf Bordieu 1992; Haugen 1966). 
 
The standard language is a language of power, based on the ‘lect’ 
of a power center (usually the capital of a polity) as spoken and 
written by the elite. (I employ the term ‘lect’ as a neutral 
denotation for a form of language used by a speech group, often 
coterminous with an ethnic group.) In the modern state, 
knowledge of this standard language is imparted to all the 
population via compulsory elementary education. In the West 
languages are opposed to dialects, the main difference between 
the two kinds of lects being writing and power. Dialects are lects 
that are spoken outside power centers and are not commonly 
committed to paper (cf Ondrejovič 2008: 119-125; Tollefson 
1991). 
 
The rise of the nation-state drastically limited the number of 
recognized and extant polities across the world. Simultaneously, 
modernity requires ever more intensive popular literacy. As a 
result, the vast majority of lects were condemned to the status of 
lowly dialects, whereas a small number of lects endowed with a 
fully-fledged written form was elevated to the rank of languages. 
The exigencies of national state-building and statehood 
legitimation have required to ‘regulate’ the relationship between 
languages and dialects. In Europe, it has been commonly 
proposed that dialects spoken on the territory of a polity ‘belong’ 
to the polity’s official language. Ideally, in the process of 
modernization, compulsory schooling should liquidate dialects and 
replace them with the uniform employment of the official 
language (cf Fishman 1973; Markowski and Puzynina 1994). 
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This dichotomy of languages and dialects, as part and parcel of 
modernization, became the norm of thinking about and regulating 
the linguistic in today’s world of nation-states (cf Fishman 1974; 
Page 1964). However, as mentioned above, though important in 
many various ways elsewhere, languages became the very basis, 
the sole ideological fundament of nation-state building and 
national statehood legitimation in Central Europe (cf Hroch 1994; 
Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 1998). 
 
Imagining the Normative Concepts of Modernity 
 
Nowadays the linguistic is imagined to consist of discrete 
languages. In this manner, rather unheard of in the past, humans 
actively and – more or less – consciously alter the linguistic, its 
shape previously decided by ‘nature’ (which is shorthand for the 
exigencies of human biology and evolution). This new-style 
linguistic reality composed of discrete languages is as much the 
foundation of the modernity as nation-states and the nation. The 
spell-checker of the word processor that I am using to write this 
article is set to conform with the ‘US English’ spelling, and when 
you consult a typical entry in the Anglophone Wikipedia the 
website alerts you that this entry is also available in the 200 odd 
Wikipedias in different languages. At present IT technology is 
mediated through and supports internet resources in about 600 
languages (Kamusella 2012). 
 
As now convincingly established in the wide-ranging discussion 
since the early 1980s, nations and states are invented and 
imagined into being before they become part of the social reality, 
which we, humans, perceive as ‘our world.’ I propose that 
languages are equally invented and imagined into being 
(Kamusella 2004). The modern world is composed from the 
foundational elements (artifacts) that are construed to be states, 
nations and languages. In the state-containers nations (people) 
live and communicate with the use of their respective languages. 
However, more correctly, it is to say that the political, the social 
and the linguistic of the modern world are normatively forced into 
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the straitjacket of states, nations and languages. Saying it in this 
way we can immediately tease out the imagined or invented 
character of these arrangements. 
 
But the discussion is not complete without drawing our attention 
to the fact that as much as this modern ‘order of things’ is man-
made (imagined), the three categories of ‘state,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘a 
language’ were also imagined into being. (Importantly, which 
should not be forgotten in the until recently heard rhetoric that 
saw globalization as a change for good, these categories are 
European inventions that the West imposed on the rest of the 
world [cf Fanon 1963; Kamusella 2000].) Both, these categories 
and their actualizations, are man-made (‘invented,’ ‘imagined’) 
artifacts of culture (that is, they are not products of nature, 
understood as the reality and forces independent of human will). 
 
Conventionally, artifacts of this kind are classified either as 
‘material’ or ‘immaterial.’ In this case, the aforementioned 
categories and their actualizations belong to the latter set of 
immaterial entities of culture. Contrary to popular usage, the 
qualification ‘immaterial’ does not mean that the aforementioned 
artifacts are stuff of legends with no bearing on the actual 
(human) world around us. Languages, nations and states are not 
visible or tactile as entities but they are quite real. Humans act in 
accordance with their logic and produce material things dictated 
by the ‘immaterial’ existence of these entities, among others, 
books, border posts or pantheons. Languages, nations and states 
are imagined and their existence is maintained in the heads of 
people belonging to a given group that uses a given language, 
belonging to this or that nation, housed in a given state. The 
actual material existence of these ‘immaterial’ entities and their 
categories hinges on their neurally executed image (in the brain) 
shared across a human group or groups. 
 
An extraterrestrial visitor would not be able to see through a 
telescope or detect (for instance, with the use of a mass 
spectrometer) languages, nations or states on earth. This 
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hypothetical visitor may discern these entities only upon 
acquiring a human language and living among the members of a 
nation in a state, unless the hypothetical visitor from outer space 
has some device giving it full access to human brains and their 
workings. 
 
 
Which Nationalism in Central Europe? 
 
Whenever one opens a monograph on nationalism, in most cases, 
examples of this ideology are taken from Central (and Eastern) 
Europe. Quite often the discussion is underpinned by the tacit 
opinion that ‘the problem of nationalism’ occurs only in ‘the East,’ 
meaning the region of Central (and Eastern) Europe. When it is 
conceded that nowadays the ideology of nationalism also 
underlies and legitimates nation-states in ‘the West’ (that is, in 
Western Europe and North America), this Western-style 
nationalism is posed as ‘civic, rational and benign;’ while its 
Eastern counterpart as ‘irrational, ethnic’ and simply ‘bad.’ It is a 
reflection of the classical dichotomy of civic (‘good’) and ethnic 
(‘bad’) nationalism (cf Jaskułowski 2010; Plamenatz 1973). 
 
Civic, Ethnic? 
 
Obviously, this dichotomy – as it is well known – is heavily value-
laden, and guilty of ‘orientalizing’ the East, while positioning the 
West (or ‘us’ from the vantage of most authors commenting on 
this dichotomy) in the privileged center of rational thinking, from 
where to opine about the rest of the world (cf Jezernik 2004). 
Apart from this subjective bent, the typical discussion on 
nationalism is limited to Europe, as if all the other polities extant 
across the present-day world were not nation-states, which they 
are, with the rare exception of the Vatican City State. 
 
When civic nationalism is indubitably connected to the institution 
of citizenship, there is not an equal or easily observable trait on 
which ethnic nationalism would hinge. Ethnicity is a legion of 
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things, basically any set or constellation of cultural traits 
employed by a group to define itself, and justify and maintain its 
cohesion. When a group of this kind claims to be a nation, and 
this claim is recognized by the already existing nations 
(especially, those endowed with their own nation-states), its 
ethnicity and its state-making uses become ‘ethnic nationalism.’ 
In such an understanding of nationalism, ‘nation’ is the highest 
political title a human group can gain in today’s world (not unlike 
the title of professor among scholars). This title gives a group 
distinguished in this manner the legitimate right to seek 
statehood (that is, power that can be legitimately exercised on 
the plane of international relations). 
 
Language and Nationalism 
 
One of the elements of culture frequently identified with ethnic 
nationalism is [a] language (Einzelsprache). It is especially true 
of the practice of nation- and nation-state building and 
maintenance in Central Europe beginning in the early 20th 
century. The Polish nation and state are correlated with the Polish 
language, the Macedonian nation and state with the Macedonian 
language, or the Norwegian nation and state with the Norwegian 
language. This coupling of nationalism with language as its very 
basis is typical of Central Europe, thus for the sake of clarity, I 
propose to dub the prevalent kind of nationalism in this region as 
‘ethnolinguistic,’ rather than merely ‘ethnic.’ 
 
Strangely, many (if not most) theoretical and classical works on 
nationalism draw on Central Europe, and generalize with the use 
of examples taken from this region on this ideology of politicized 
groupness and state formation. I propose that if ethnolinguistic 
nationalism is limited to Central Europe, conclusions and 
generalizations distilled on the basis of cases taken from this 
region may not be of much explicatory value for the rest of the 
world, where ethnolinguistic nationalism is unknown or not 
practiced in any politically salient manner. 
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Inventing Nations, States and Languages 
 
Benedict Anderson (1983), and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger (1983) saliently remarked that nations are ‘invented,’ or 
‘imagined’ into being. Nations are imagined through history, the 
printing press (or ‘print capitalism’), politics, national movements, 
newspapers, books, educational systems, conscript armies, state 
bureaucracies and the like. But this invented character of nations 
is not specific exclusively to them. States are also invented or 
imagined in a similar manner as ‘spatial containers’ in which 
members of a specific group (nowadays, a nation) have the right 
to live, and all the others are ‘foreigners’ to be kept out. The 
spatiality of the state is most visibly manifested in its border, 
being an irregular loop that delimits the state’s ‘territorial body’ 
(Winichakul 1994) (thus, defining the limits of the ‘in-group’) and 
separates it from all the other extant polities. 
 
I propose to see languages in a similar light, as invented, 
especially those that are ‘reduced to writing,’ defined, 
regularized, stabilized and bounded with officially approved 
dictionaries, grammars, spelling manuals, encyclopedias and 
other authoritative publications. All these features are hallmarks 
of the process of language standardization, or language building, 
that is, creating languages as discrete entities, artifacts of 
culture, Einzelsprachen. In the course of this process, a 
predefined fragment of the naturally continuous linguistic is cut 
out and separated to be fashioned into a discrete entity, known 
as a language (Einzelsprache). This language is imparted in a 
formalized (‘standard’) way through the educational system, the 
bureaucracy, the press, and the like to ‘its’ target population (or 
imposed on it), and then successively from one generation to 
another. 
 
Scholars do realize that states are formed, maintained and 
destroyed, and that once upon a time there were even no states 
(in the modern sense of this term) at all. In this national age of 
ours, when we trust that despite our individual mortality we may 
17 
 
live in the memory and the collective body of ‘our’ – potentially 
immortal – nation, it is possible – though sometimes painfully 
difficult – to concede that human groups (be them dubbed 
nations, or not) emerge, exist and disappear, in much the same 
way as states do. But often it is almost next to impossible to 
argue the same for languages, despite much literature on the 
phenomenon of ‘language death’ (that is, of disappearance of 
languages, their falling out of use among speech communities). 
Languages appearing so ‘natural’ to us, due to the fact that we 
employ them all the time for bonding and communicating within a 
given speech community, it is often difficult to take a step back 
and calmly observe that they are just human creations. It is 
especially true of written, standard languages, walled off all 
others by a mass of legislation, officialdom and printed matter. 
 
Let me mention several examples. In the interwar period there 
were such languages – now forgotten – as Czechoslovak and 
Serbo-Croato-Slovenian. The former comprised two varieties, 
namely, Czech and Slovak (Kamusella 2007). The same was true 
of Serbo-Croato-Slovenian composed of Serbo-Croatian and 
Slovenian. Both the languages are long gone, though Norwegian 
continues in a similarly composite fashion, comprising Nynorsk 
(‘New Norwegian’) and Bokmål (‘Book Language’). Although 
Greek is proposed to be a unitary language with a three-
millennia-long unbroken history, for all practical reasons, an 
educated Greek wishing to function fluently in all the registers of 
this language as employed nowadays, she must acquire Demotic 
(Vernacular Greek, official in Greece only since 1976) and 
Katharevousa (‘Purifying Language’) in which much literature and 
most documents were written during the last two centuries, 
alongside the New Testament and Ancient Greek used for liturgy 
in church and literary flourishes (Mackridge 2009). 
 
Languages, like states, can break up into successor ones, as 
recently vividly exemplified by the split of Serbo-Croatian into 
Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin (Greenberg 2004). The 
popular definition claims that dialects (lects) are mutually 
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intelligible forms of language, while languages (lects) are their 
mutually unintelligible counterparts (Bloomfield 1926: 162).  But 
some dialects of Chinese are as mutually incomprehensible as 
Polish and German (Künstler 2000); on the other hand the 
languages of Moldovan and Romanian are exactly the same 
(Ciscel 2007), while the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages 
hardly differ from one another. 
 
 
The Normative Isomorphism of Language, Nation and 
States 
 
Despite the importance of language for Central Europe’s 
ethnolinguistic nationalisms, so often pointed to in literature on 
nationalism, I have not encountered a precise definition of this 
type of nationalism that would allow for focused analysis and 
wide-ranging comparisons. Thus, I propose to operationalize the 
concept of ethnolinguistic nationalism, by defining this ideology 
through the actual practices of nation-state building and 
maintenance in Central Europe, as observed in policy-making. 
 
These practices tend to propose that a ‘true and legitimate’ 
nation-state is such whose territory is inhabited by the speakers 
of one language only. This – by default, national – language 
cannot be shared with any other state or nation. The language’s 
speakers (or speech community in sociolinguistic terminology) 
are defined as a nation. Furthermore, the nation-state’s territory 
must not house any autonomous entities with official languages 
different than the national one. And by the same token no 
autonomous entities with the nation-state’s national language as 
official can exist outside this national polity. As a result, where 
the program has been fulfilled, it leads to a tight spatial and 
ideological (symbolical) overlapping of language, nation and 
state. I dub this foundational mechanism of ethnolinguistic 
nationalism as the ‘normative isomorphism of language, nation 
and state’ (Kamusella 2006).  
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Below, I briefly show how this proposed analytical instrument of 
the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state may be 
employed for tracing the emergence and the subsequent spread 
of the model of ethnolinguistic nation-state through time in 
Central Europe, before extending its application to East and 
Southeastern Asia. Because this analytical instrument of the 
normative isomorphism as any other has its own inherent 
limitations, I identify them and suggest how a nuancing of the 
data can be conducted in order to limit distortions in the 
outcomes of analyses conducted with the use of this instrument. 
 
The Diachronic Perspective 
 
The first isomorphic (ethnolinguistic) nation-states appeared in 
the Balkans in the late 19th century, before the normative 
isomorphism became the basic method of nation-state building 
and of national statehood legitimation and maintenance in Central 
Europe after the Great War. I focus on the situation between 
1864 and 1913 in a series of selected annual snapshots in the 
table below. In bold I give names of new isomorphic states that 
appeared in a given year (or a bit earlier, in-between two 
ranges), while in the third column I indicate names of some 
polities that lost their isomorphic status, the cause of such an 
occurrence briefly alluded in brackets. 
 
Year Isomorphic States Number of 
Isomorphic States 
1864 Greece 1 
1866 Greece, Romania 2 
1885 Bulgaria, Romania 2 Greece [Cyprus] 
1905 Bulgaria, Norway, Romania 3 
1913 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, Romania 4 
Table 1 
 
Greece, as the first nation-state ever, began to fulfill the 
requirements of the normative isomorphism, thanks to the 1864 
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union with the United States of the Ionian Islands. Previously the 
two polities had shared Greek as their official language, which 
had prevented them from becoming isomorphic.7 The last stage 
of the process of the creation of the Romanian nation-state lasted 
between 1859 and 1866, when the principalities of Moldavia and 
Walachia were transformed into a single polity with the newly 
invented name of Romania, and Romanian as its sole official and 
national language. In 1878 Bulgaria became de facto independent 
from the Ottoman Empire, and having instituted Bulgarian as its 
exclusive official and national language, almost joined the ranks 
of the isomorphic club, but for the Ottoman autonomous province 
of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgarian as one of its official languages. 
Bulgaria finally reached the ideal of the normative isomorphism 
seven years later, when it annexed this autonomous province.  
 
In the year of the founding of Bulgaria (1878), Greece lost its 
isomorphic status, due to the making of Ottoman Cyprus into a 
British protectorate with Greek as one of its official languages. In 
the last decade preceding World War I, Norway and Albania 
gained independence from Denmark in 1905 and the Ottoman 
Empire in 1912/13, respectively. Both polities, with Norwegian 
and Albanian as official and national languages, respectively, 
fashioned themselves into ethnolinguistic nation-states fulfilling 
the principles of the normative isomorphism. 
 
It appears that the model of ethnolinguistic nation-state meeting 
all the strictures of the normative isomorphism of language, 
nation and state emerged first in the Balkans. Perhaps, it 
happened so, because of the gradual replacement of religion with 
language as the ideological basis of Balkan nation-states 
established since the early 19th century. This change took place, 
                                                          
7 Obviously, Greek was one of the official languages in the Orthodox (‘Roman’) millet of the 
Ottoman Empire. But millets were non-territorial confessional autonomies. As such they did 
not follow the Westphalian logic of the territorial state. As a result, from the (West and 
Central) European perspective, only Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) was official in this 
empire, the millet languages appearing to Europeans to be mere ‘minority languages.’ 
21 
 
probably, under the stimulating examples of such militarily and 
economically successful polities as the Kingdom of Italy and the 
German Empire. They were established as ethnolinguistic nation-
states aspiring to become ‘homes’ for all the Italians (meaning 
Italian-speakers) and for all the Germans (meaning, German-
speakers) in 1861 and 1871, respectively. 
 
The Great War destroyed the non-national multiethnic empires of 
Central Europe, namely, Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire 
and the Ottoman Empire. The Western Allies, at the peace 
conference in Paris, replaced them with nation-states explicitly 
defined in ethnolinguistic terms. In this way, the normative 
isomorphism ‘moved’ northward (see below Table 2). The freshly 
established (de jure autonomous, but de facto independent) 
Ukraine joined the ranks of the isomorphic national polities in 
1917 only to be ‘booted out’ from the club the following year 
when another Ukrainian polity (Western Ukraine) emerged in 
Galicia. Both Ukrainian states were united in 1919 (Act of Zluka, 
or Union), and thus this new Ukrainian nation-state regained its 
isomorphic status. (In the table’s middle rubric on ‘Isomorphic 
States,’ I include in braces brief information on why a given polity 
regained its previously lost isomorphic status.) 
 
Year Isomorphic States Number of 
Isomorphic States 
1916 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, 
Romania 
4 
1917 Albania, Bulgaria, Norway, 
Ukraine 
4 Romania [Moldova] 
1918 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland 
9 Ukraine [West 
Ukraine] 
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1919 Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Norway, Poland, Romania 
{Moldova incorporated}, Ukraine 
{Zluka} 
8 Belarus [defunct] , 
Hungary [Red 
Slovakia], Lithuania 
[Perloja]  
1920 Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Norway, 
Romania, Ukraine  
9 Poland [Red Galicia] 
Table 2 
 
A similar development can be observed in the case of Romania 
that, between 1917 and 1918, ceased to be an isomorphic state, 
following the rise of the Moldavian Democratic Republic in the 
former Russian province of Bessarabia. Both Romanian-speaking 
polities contracted a union in 1918, meaning that in the table’s 
1919 row Romania is again a fully isomorphic polity. 
 
The Soviet onslaught extinguished Belarus as a nation-state at 
the turn of 1919. In June a short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic 
with Slovak and Hungarian as its official languages was founded, 
which nullified the isomorphic status of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic. Likewise, Lithuania and Poland were pushed out from 
the set of isomorphic polities; the former polity, due to the rise of 
the non-national village Republic of Perloja (1918-1923, with 
Lithuanian as its official language). The same purpose was served 
by the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic in the case of Poland. 
The Soviets established this short-lived socialist republic with 
Ukrainian, Polish and Yiddish as its official languages in the 
course of the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921). Last but not least, 
although Czechoslovakia entered the political map of Europe in 
1918, it achieved the ideal of the normative isomorphism only 
two years later, when its two official languages of Czech and 
Slovak were replaced with the single one under the name of 
Czechoslovak. It consisted of two varieties, namely, the 
aforementioned Czech and Slovak. 
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This brief and rather schematic overview of the changes in the 
political shape of Central Europe – as seen through the lens of the 
analytical instrument of the normative isomorphism of language, 
nation and state – depicts two phenomena, on the one hand, the 
high volatility of the political organization of this section of the 
continent in the wake of the Great War, and on the other, the 
spread of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the sole legitimate and 
popularly accepted ideology of nation-state building and 
statehood legitimation across Central Europe. The new political 
situation stabilized in the mid-1920s, and – painting in broad 
strokes – ethnolinguistic nationalism became the very defining 
feature of Central Europe as a specific region. The situation 
continues to this day. 
 
Only Isomorphic Polities? 
 
At the fall of communism in 1989, there were only three 
isomorphic nation-states in Central Europe, namely Bulgaria, 
Norway and Poland. The number of such polities had been 
seriously diminished twenty years earlier with the federalization 
of Czechoslovakia in 1969 and of Yugoslavia in 1974. In federal 
Yugoslavia, Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Kosovo had received 
Albanian as another official language side by side with Serbo-
Croatian. A similar development had been observed in Serbia’s 
other Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, where apart from the 
state language of Serbo-Croatian, the following ones had become 
co-official: Hungarian, Romanian, Rusyn and Slovak. 
 
Seen through the prism of the normative isomorphism, this 
officialization of Albanian, Hungarian and Romanian, by default, 
disqualified Albania, Hungary and Romania as isomorphic polities 
(see Table 3). By the same token, all the three nation-states 
regained its isomorphic status, when the autonomous status of 
Kosovo and Vojvodina was abolished in 1990. Likewise, when 
Czechoslovakia split in 1993 into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, the then already defunct official use of Slovak in 
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Serbia’s Vojvodina could not prevent Slovakia from fulfilling the 
normative isomorphism.  
 
Year Isomorphic States Number of 
Isomorphic 
States 
1989 Bulgaria, Norway, Poland 3 
1990 Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, 
Poland, Romania {autonomy abolished 
in Vojvodina & Kosovo} 
6 
1991 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania 
Slovenia, Ukraine 
14  
1992 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Norway Poland, Romania, Slovenia 
12 Croatia 
[Bosnia], 
Ukraine [Crimea]  
1993 Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Norway Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
14 
Table 3 
 
The observed volatility in the number of isomorphic polities is 
caused by a blind spot in the analytical instrument, namely its 
tenet that when polities or autonomous territories outside a given 
isomorphic nation-state announce this very nation-state’s 
national language as their official one, it automatically strips the 
nation-state in question of its isomorphic status. In today’s world 
such a nation-state is not permitted to do anything to prevent 
such a development, limited in this respect by the internationally 
accepted principle of sovereignty. However, a sudden drop in the 
number of isomorphic states detected with the analytical 
instrument of the normative isomorphism usually does not reflect 
any drop in the political and social importance of ethnolinguistic 
nationalism across Central Europe. Hence, in order to stress this 
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point, apart from the ‘states fulfilling the isomorphism,’ I 
introduced the additional category of ‘states aspiring to fulfill the 
isomorphism.’ The latter are frequently prevented from attaining 
the ideal of normative isomorphism by developments outside 
their borders. 
 
I propose that only both groups of isomorphic states and ‘near-
isomorphic states’ when taken together, they aptly reflect the 
territorial spread of ethnolinguistic nationalism at any given 
moment. In Table 4, I have a more nuanced look at Central 
Europe’s all 35 polities that were extant in 2007. Unlike 
previously, this analysis is not limited to the isomorphic nation-
states only. The table also contains the near-isomorphic nation-
states, while the non-isomorphic polities are split into two further 
categories of ‘other ethnolinguistic states’ and ‘non-
ethnolinguistic states.’ The former group is comprised of the 
nation-states that use language for some ideological purposes; 
however, it does not constitute the sole basis of their national 
statehood. The last group of non-ethnolinguistic states embraces 
all the other polities to which the logic of ethnolinguistic 
nationalism is nearly or completely alien. 
 
Of course, the article is too short to let me substantiate at length 
why I apportioned this or that polity to a specific rubric. And, yes, 
such a classification to a degree may be arbitrary and 
questionable in the case of borderline cases. Other authors may 
want to rearrange this table slightly or even substantially. I do 
not claim that the heuristic device of the normative isomorphism 
of language, nation and state is perfect in its detection of 
ethnolinguistic nationalism. It may, however, help interested 
researchers and observers compare the spread, influence and 
other dynamics of ethnolinguistic nationalism on the plane of 
extant polities. 
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States 
fulfilling 
the 
isomorphis
m 
  
States 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphis
m 
  
Other 
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
Non-
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
The 
total of 
the 
analyze
d 
polities 
  
Percentag
e of the 
isomorph
ic states 
in the total 
of the 
analyzed 
polities 
Isomorphic 
states and 
the states 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphis
m 
combined, 
expressed 
as a 
percentage 
of the total 
of the 
analyzed 
polities 
Albania, 
Bulgaria, 
Czech 
Republic, 
Estonia, 
Hungary, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Macedonia, 
Montenegro, 
Norway, 
Poland, 
Romania, 
Slovakia,  
Slovenia 
[14] 
Bosnia, 
Croatia, 
Cyprus, 
Finland, 
Germany, 
Greece, 
Luxembourg
, Moldova, 
Northern 
Cyprus, 
Serbia, 
Sweden, 
Turkey, 
Ukraine 
 
[13] 
Austria, 
Belarus, 
Denmark, 
Liechtenstei
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] 
Mount 
Athos, 
Russian 
Federation, 
Sovereign 
Base Areas 
of Akrotiri 
and Dheleia,  
Transnistria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] 
35 40% 77% 
Central Europe’s Isomorphic and Other Polities in 2007 
Table 4 
 
Bearing this caveat in mind, I propose that the actual extent and 
influence of ethnolinguistic nationalism in Central Europe may be 
measured only by taking into consideration both the fully 
isomorphic and near-isomorphic polities. In 2007 the two groups 
added up to 27 nation-states, or to about 77 per cent of all 
Central Europe’s polities. 
 
Population 
of the 
states 
fulfilling 
the 
isomorphi
Population 
of the 
states 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphi
Population 
of other 
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
Population 
of the non-
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
Populati
on of all 
the 
analyze
d 
polities 
Percentag
e of the 
populatio
n of the 
isomorp
hic 
Population 
of the 
isomorphi
c states 
and of the 
states 
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sm 
  
sm 
  
  states 
out of the 
total 
populatio
n  of the 
analyzed 
polities 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphi
sm 
combined, 
expressed 
as a 
percentage 
of the total 
population 
of the 
analyzed 
polities 
112.53m 245.16m 23.29m 35.07m 416.32
m 
27% 86% 
The Normative Isomorphism and Populations in 2007 
Table 5 
 
Populations and Languages 
 
States, widely varying in demographic size and territory, are 
however far from being the ideal unit of analysis and comparison. 
In order to lessen the distortion entailed, I included the 
populations of the analyzed states in the purview (see Table 5). 
From this demographic perspective, although the number of the 
isomorphic nation-states in 2007 amounted to circa 50 per cent 
of Central Europe’s polities, their populations added to a merely 
27 per cent of the region’s inhabitants. But the populations of the 
isomorphic and near-isomorphic nation-states combined, at 86 
per cent, decisively surpassed the percentage of the isomorphic 
and near-isomorphic nation-states among Central Europe’s 
polities. 
 
Hence, I daresay that nowadays almost the entire population of 
Central Europe (bar 10 or so per cent) live in the region’s 
isomorphic and near-isomorphic nation-states. As such these 
people are exposed to the influence and workings of the 
normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, which they 
imbibe in the course of their everyday life, be it at school, from 
the mass media or through interacting with the state 
bureaucracy. In such a way, in their minds, ethnolinguistic 
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nationalism becomes a ‘transparent category,’ the very synonym 
of ‘socio-political normalcy.’ For the inhabitants of the isomorphic 
and near-isomorphic countries the ‘normal,’ ‘genuine’ and 
legitimate polity is an ethnolinguistic nation-state meeting all the 
requirements of the normative isomorphism of language, nation 
and state. The deep entrenchment of this normative belief in the 
vast majority of peoples’ minds across Central Europe 
perpetuates this ideology of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the 
very basis of the political order in the region. 
 
 
The Isomorphism in East and Southeast Asia 
 
Looking Farther Afield 
 
Having embarked on the analysis of the normative isomorphism 
of language, nation and state, initially, I thought that the sole 
group of ethnolinguistic nation-states occurs only in Central 
Europe. I saw ethnolinguistic polities popping up outside Central 
Europe, as for instance, Iceland (with its specific national 
language of Icelandic, not shared with any other polity or nation), 
Turkmenistan (with Turkmen), Bhutan (with Dongka) or the 
Maldives (with Maldivian) as rare oddities, a result of accidents 
and other random exigencies of history, and not of any 
concentrated ‘ideological plan’ as in Central Europe.8 
 
But then, when I browsed the globe for further isomorphic 
polities, regularities began to emerge. First, I noticed that these 
‘oddities’ of ethnolinguistc national statehood are limited to 
Eurasia only. At present no isomorphic or near-isomorphic nation-
states seem to exist in Africa or in the Americas, where the local 
ethnolinguistic cultures were either wiped out or permanently 
                                                          
8 Obviously, there was no ‘mastermind’ behind this alluded plan. It was a result of the 
growing acceptance among the population at large of the idea that polities in order to be 
legitimate, they must assume the form of ethnolinguistic nation-states. When the idea 
became the norm of the political organization of Central Europe after 1918, it looked as if a 
‘plan’ to this end had been rapidly implemented. 
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submerged by the succession of Western colonialism, imperialism 
and nowadays, Western cultural and economic imperialism. 
 
The Other Cluster of Isomorphic Nation-States 
 
These realizations made me stop and think. I scanned carefully 
the world’s all extant states in regard of their official language 
policies, and then was surprised to find out that another group of 
ethnolinguistic nation-states that appear to fulfill the strict 
requirements of the normative isomorphism of language, nation 
and state, is located in East and Southeast (E/SE) Asia. I include 
in this E/SE Asian group of isomorphic nation-state, the following 
ones: Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Malaysia would almost make it into this group, but for 
the co-official use of Malaysian in Brunei and Singapore. Likewise 
Korea could be an isomorphic polity, if it was not divided into two 
states and Korean was not used for official purposes in China’s 
Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture. 
 
Isomorphic 
region 
‘Member states’ Number 
of states 
Population Territory  
(sq km) 
C Europe Albania, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia,  Slovenia 
14 112.53m 1,045,756 
SE/E Asia Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Vietnam 
7 571.16m 4,236,127 
 C Europe data as a percentage of 
E/SE Asia data 
200% 
(14 : 7) 
19.7% 24.7% 
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Isomorphism in Central Europe, and in Southeast and East Asia in 
20079 
Table 6 
 
The Example of Japan 
 
I hypothesize that the transfer of the ideas and practices of the 
normative isomorphism of language, nation and state was from 
(Central) Europe to E/SE Asia, not the other way around. I 
propose to check the following three possible channels of 
transmission of relevant ideas. Firstly, from Prussia to Japan, 
which successfully turned itself into the core of the ideologically 
ethnolinguistic German Empire in 1871. When the elites of the 
Meiji Japan were looking for a model of modernization (or, in 
reality, Westernization) that would be suitable for Japan, they 
sent an official governmental mission on a fact-finding tour 
around the world from 1871-1873 (Nish 1998). When it came to 
the system of government, statehood and education, the 
mission’s members were impressed by and liked most what they 
saw in the German Empire (Kume 2002). They decided to follow 
this model in Japan, including the language policy and the 
entailed concept of the ethnolinguistic homogenous (and ideally 
isomorphic) nation-state (Yeounsuk 2010: 160-169). 
 
Due to the subsequent military, colonial and economic successes 
of Japan, it was seen as the sole non-Western polity that 
achieved a sought-for badge of modernity. As such, the country 
became a model in its own right to look to for anticolonial and 
national movements (Narangoa and Cribb 2003) and also for 
remaining independent non-Western polities, such as the 
Ottoman Empire (Worringer 2014) or Abyssinia (or today’s 
Ethiopia) (Clarke 2011: 37-38). Furthermore, it was the rapid and 
extensive expansion of the Empire of Japan during the first half of 
the 20th century that brought this model of the ethnolinguistic 
nation-state to much of East and Southeast Asia, from Mongolia 
                                                          
9 The data on the states’ populations and territories were taken from Index Mundi (2014). 
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to the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia) and from Burma to 
the Philippines (Mendl 2001; Pluvier 1995: map 52). During the 
Second World War, the Japanese occupation administration – 
unlike their German counterpart in Central Europe – in 1943-
1945 brought many students from Southeast Asia to receive 
education at Japanese universities. After the war they brought an 
intimate knowledge of the Japanese model of ethnolinguistically 
homogenous nation-state back home, where they became 
members of the intellectual and political elite, first in the 
anticolonial national movements, and next in their freshly 
independent postcolonial nation-states (Goodman 2001: 254-
255). 
 
France: Language Rather Than Citizenship 
 
Secondly, another channel via which the ideas of ethnolinguistic 
homogeneous national statehood spread, especially to Southeast 
Asia proper, was that of the French colonial empire. Though 
ostensibly, the ideological basis of the French nationhood and 
statehood is citizenship (Brubaker 1992), the reality of the French 
nation-state is thoroughly ethnolinguistic. The program of 
ethnolinguistic homogenization of France – as part and parcel of 
the republican policy of centralization and administrative 
homogenization (or ‘rationalization’) – has been continually and 
consistently carried out since the French Revolution (Weber 
1996). The sole difference between the French ethnolinguistic 
nationalism and any typical isomorphic nation-state is that Paris 
is more than happy for other polities (especially, its former 
colonies) to adopt its national language of French (cf Poissonnier 
and Sournia 2006), which even today is posed as the world’s 
‘universal and most logic’ language (Beaucé 1988). 
 
The French channel provided for direct transfer of ideas and 
political know-how to the French colonies in Indochina, and 
indirectly to Siam (or officially Thailand after 1939). The French 
colonial administration, steeped in the metropolitan ideal of 
ethnolinguistically homogenous statehood employed it tactically, 
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in line with the typical imperial principle divide et impera (‘divide 
and rule’). Paris was eventually unsuccessful in its attempts at 
annexing Siam. But on the basis of the ethnolinguistic difference 
as tiny as that between Serbian and Croatian, French colonialists 
managed to seize Siam’s eastern (Lao) provinces, subsequently 
made into a French colony (cf Pluvier 1995: map 44). Paris 
justified this annexation with ethnolinguistic arguments, leading 
to the fashioning of a Lao nation, complete with its own national 
Laotian language and script, made on purpose and with much 
investment distinctive from the Thai counterparts (cf Ivarsson 
2008: 93-144). 
 
Faced with the French imperial pressure, Siam – previously happy 
to portray itself as a multiethnic empire – adopted the rhetoric of 
the ethnolinguistic nation-state. This led to the 1939 change in 
the state’s name, from Siam to Thailand (in vernacular Thai, even 
previously, the country was unofficially referred to as Mueang 
Thai or the ‘country of Thais’), so that it would correspond to the 
name of the polity’s main ethnic group, Thais, and their language, 
Thai. As a result, after 1939, Thailand reinvented itself as an 
isomorphic polity, for the Thai-speaking nation of Thais, their 
language not shared with any other polity or nation (Streckfuss 
1993). This rhetoric of ethnolinguistic nationalism, combined with 
the wholesale Westernization (‘modernization’) of the state and 
society made it harder for any European imperial power to justify 
a potential colonial foray into Thailand  (cf Winichakul 1994). 
 
In Cambodia, the French pursued a similar policy as in Laos, 
aimed at severing cultural, religious and linguistic ties with Siam 
(Thailand). To this end, among others, they encouraged the 
standardization and the use of the Khmer language and script in 
the nascent Khmerophone press and book production (Chandler 
2000: 159-164; Edwards 2004). Interestingly, the invention of 
the ethnolinguistic Khmer nation speaking its own Khmer 
language, written down in Khmer letters was not followed by the 
adoption of a corresponding name for the nation-state. However, 
the colloquial name of the country, Srok Khmer (literally, ‘the 
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land of the Khmers’), has been current (for instance, as a title of 
a seminar journal) at least since the 1930s (cf Edwards 2007: 
205). 
 
The name ‘Cambodia’ is of a Sanskrit origin, like that of ‘Siam.’ 
The political and cultural attraction of such names is connected to 
the acceptance of (Theravada) Buddhism in most of Indochina 
(during the first half of the First Millennium CE) as the state 
religion (or in today’s Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand). A 
later version of Sanskrit, Pali, is the language in which the 
Buddhist canon (Tipitaka) was recorded. The language’s Brahmi 
script and its variations (also used for writing in Sanskrit) and 
Buddhism itself lent an aura of noble significance to Sanskritizing 
terms and names. The translation of this canon into vernaculars, 
especially at the turn of the 20th century, facilitated the 
codification of the languages of Burmese, Khmer, Laotian and 
Thai, alongside their varying scripts. This development and its 
influence is similar to the language-making effects of translating 
the Bible into Europe’s vernaculars during and in the wake of the 
Reformation (cf Juntanamalaga 1988; Norman 1993; Pulvier 
1995: map 3; Thion 1993; Yamin 1956: 27). 
 
In the case of these territories that later were made into Vietnam, 
during the second half of the 19th century, France, preceded by 
Catholic missionaries, sought to distance the Vietnamese from 
traditional Chinese cultural and religious influence, while 
maintaining an ethnocultural difference between Vietnam on the 
one hand, and the Khmers and the Lao, on the other. Replacing 
the Chinese script with the Latin alphabet for writing the 
Vietnamese language served this purpose best, especially at the 
symbolical level of ideology (Marr 1981: 136-189). Subsequently, 
while some members of the nascent Vietnamese anticolonial 
national movement hoped to achieve modernization and 
independence through emulating France (cf Mishra 2012: 193-
194), others sought ‘modern’ education in Japan, especially after 
Tokyo’s 1905 victory over Russia (Vo 2011: 93). 
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The Soviet ‘Affirmative Action Empire’ 
 
Thirdly, I propose that another channel through which the 
political fashion of ethnolinguistic nationalism reached East and 
Southeast Asia was that of communism stemming from the 
Soviet Union. Often the Soviet influence was filtered through 
China, which in 1949, became a ‘Soviet pupil.’ This master-pupil 
relation between the two communist states lasted until the Sino-
Soviet rift in the 1960s. The Soviet model – to a degree adopted 
in Burma (later, Myanmar), Cambodia, China, Laos, North Korea 
and Vietnam – came complete with a package of policies on 
ethnolinguistic diversity. 
 
In the interwar period the internal administrative organization of 
the Soviet Union was designed, at all its levels, alongside 
ethnolinguistic lines (cf Martin 2001). Moscow pursued a similar 
policy in regard of the Soviet bloc as a whole, that is, of the 
reinforcement of ethnolinguistic homogeneity within its member 
states. The bloc mostly composed of isomorphic or near-
isomorphic nation-states, the Soviet stance on this issue ensured 
loyalty or, at least, grudging acceptance of the new system by 
largely anticommunist populations, who placed so much 
ideological value on nationally construed ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity (in emotional rhetoric referred to as ‘purity’). 
 
The Soviet model of multilevel ethnolinguistically defined 
administrative entities was copied in communist China. But, 
unlike in the Soviet Union, at the highest level of administrative 
division the Chinese territory was not apportioned in its entirety 
among ethnolinguistic ‘union republics.’ In this respect, like 
today’s Russian Federation, despite official protestations to the 
opposite, China remains an aspiring ethnolinguistic nation-state 
with territorial autonomies for its recognized non-Han minorities 
(cf Zhou 2003: 51-55, 169-288). However, other communist 
polities in E/SE Asia appear to have chosen the example of the 
Soviet bloc countries in Europe, and as a result, followed the 
course of centralization and ethnolinguistic homogenization. 
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At the Margins 
 
In the Dutch East Indies, a collection of thousands of 
ethnolinguistically highly diverse islands, the Dutch colonial 
administration used ‘market Malay’ for ruling over the huge 
archipelago. Hence, the 1914 introduction of Dutch as a medium 
of education in a tiny clutch of ‘non-European’ schools, and more 
concentrated efforts for the promotion of the use of this language 
among ‘non-Europeans’ undertaken during the 1930s did not 
alter the prevailing sociolinguistic situation (Simpson 2007: 318). 
In 1928 the nascent anticolonial national movement adopted 
Malay as its national language and the name of Indonesia (coined 
in scholarly European usage during the 1880s) for their 
postulated nation-state. In light of the latter, national activists 
also renamed the language as ‘Indonesian,’ and in this manner a 
program of the Indonesian-speaking nation-state of Indonesia 
was launched. The Japanese occupation in 1942 and Tokyo’s 
1945 grant of independence to Indonesia in the wake of the slow-
motion collapse of Japan’s wartime empire of the ‘Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ lent much credence and legitimacy to 
the Indonesian national movement. Against this background, 
following the brutal four-year-long war waged by the Dutch, this 
national movement held its own and Indonesia gained fully 
internationally recognized independence in 1949 (Dharmowijono 
1989: 298; Swaan 2001: 82, 87). 
 
The course of inventing Burma (later Myanmar) as an 
ethnolinguistic nation-state is somewhat similar in its marginality 
to the above-proposed three main ways of the spread of the 
normative isomorphism of language, nation and state to E/SE 
Asia. Between 1824 and 1885, the British forces from India 
conquered, in a piecemeal fashion, the territories that became 
Myanmar nowadays. These territories were incorporated into 
British India. The rise of the anticolonial national movement in 
the 1920s and 30s, combined with the religious difference 
between Buddhist Burma and predominantly Hindu and Muslim 
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India, the former was excluded from India in 1937, and fashioned 
into a crown colony in its own right. Unlike elsewhere in India, 
Burmese national activists consistently emphasized the Burmese 
language against the use of English in offices and schools. In 
1930 they adopted a purely isomorphic program of building an 
ethnolinguistically homogenous Burmese nation-state, which 
entailed Burmanization of the non-Burmese-speaking ethnic 
groups. This heavy-handed policy remains the source of 
widespread and prolonged ethnic conflicts across the country 
(Bečka 2007: 154-155, 164-166; Watkins 2007: 270-273). 
 
Burma gained independence in 1948. The present-day confusion 
on how to write the name of the state and its language is a 
reflection of the renewed wave of Burmanization that commenced 
in 1989. Myanmar is another transliteration of the Burmese-
language form of the name of Burma, however, closer to its 
Burmese pronunciation than the Anglicized name ‘Burma.’ Hence, 
beginning in 1989, the state requests that it be known in English 
as ‘Myanmar.’ The name is also shared by the nation living in the 
state, and by its language, both are referred to as ‘Myanmar,’ too 
(Bečka 2007: 5; Watkins 2007: 274). (Such a request is nothing 
unprecedented. In 1991 Belarus asked to be officially recognized 
as ‘Belarus’ in other languages, not as ‘Byelorussia’ or ‘White 
Russia,’ which had been the practice earlier.) Interestingly, the 
very name ‘Myanmar’ is quite a recent coinage dating back to the 
mid-19th century (Myint-U 2001: 27). 
 
 
Idle Divagations or Salient Comparisons? 
 
No Isomorphism Without Authoritarianism? 
 
Interestingly, and rather saliently, almost all of today’s fully 
isomorphic states in Central Europe and E/SE Asia experienced or 
still experience communism. Partial exceptions to this norm are 
Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and Norway. But in the case of 
Indonesia communism was part and parcel of the postcolonial 
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nation-state’s politics and social life till the 1965 genocide of the 
country’s communists and their families (Mehr 2009). However, 
all the isomorphic polities in Central Europe and E/SE Asia – with 
the lone exception of Norway (perhaps, closer in this respect to 
the ‘outlier’ isomorphic nation-state of Iceland) – experienced, or 
still do, authoritarianism of this or that hue. This fact appears to 
be caused by the simultaneously exclusionary and highly intrusive 
(in private and public) character of the policy of ethnolinguistic 
homogenization, and by drastic centralization required by the 
normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. 
 
All the isomorphic polities in the European and Asian clusters, 
prior to their emergence, were part of larger states or empires 
(as in the case of Central Europe), or were either seized or 
indirectly dominated by Western colonial empires (as in the case 
of E/SE Asia). Hence, the social, political and economic reality 
with which ethnolinguistic nationalists were faced was in most 
cases multilingual, multiethnic, and often polyconfessional. 
Reducing this diversity into a homogeneity within the boundaries 
of an isomorphic nation-state necessitated a series of wide-
ranging impositions by the center. (Obviously, such a 
modernizing ‘reduction’ can also follow other ideological 
paradigms than the normative isomorphism, as usefully 
illustrated by the official quadrilingualism in the interwar Soviet 
Belarus, or by bilingualism in independent Belarus nowadays.) 
Thorough social and political engineering of this kind, touching 
upon all aspects of social and political life, would not have been 
possible under a liberal regime that typically accord powers of co-
decision to the state’s inhabitants at regional and local levels. In 
such a liberal situation these inhabitant would have certainly 
demanded the introduction of nuanced multilingual regimes, 
complete with non-territorial and territorial autonomies, perhaps, 
as in today’s India, Finland or Ethiopia10. 
                                                          
10 In the case of Ethiopia, the pronouncedly non-isomorphic federalization of the country in 
1996 was not a result of any liberalism but rather of the long armed struggle of various 
ethnolionguistically defined groupings against centralism and homogenization carried out on 
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The model of how to institute a centralizing state and how to 
carry out and maintain such wholesale centralization of 
bureaucracy and administration was readily offered by the French 
nation-state. As to my knowledge, nowadays, all the states in 
both the clusters of the isomorphic polities in E/SE Asia and 
Central Europe are highly centralistic. In this they do follow the 
French model of national statehood. Tellingly, Germany was close 
to achieving the normative isomorphism of language, nation and 
state only during the national socialist regime (1933-1945) when 
the old political tradition of federalism (or of complex and 
multilayered autonomies) was abolished, replaced with stern 
party-cum-state centralism. Federal system was reinstated in 
(West) Germany and Austria, respectively, in 1949 and 1955. 
 
Not surprisingly, federalism and autonomy are ideas of which 
each and every isomorphic polity in E/SE Asia and Central Europe 
is highly apprehensive. Changes to this end might soon breach 
the full fulfillment of the normative isomorphism, so much 
cherished as the basis of national statehood and its legitimacy. 
Hence, only after the six decades of civil warfare, in 2010, 
Myanmar’s administrative ‘divisions’ with ethnolinguistically 
different minority populations were renamed as ‘states.’ Not that 
it has led to any federalization of the country (Myanmar 2014). 
On the other hand, as most of Central Europe’s isomorphic 
nation-states are members of European Union, with time, this 
suprastate type of federalism may erode the ideal of full 
normative isomorphism in some of these polities. 
 
Isomorphic, Non-Isomorphic and Other Polities 
 
As in the case of Table 4 above, on Central Europe’s Isomorphic 
and Other Polities in 2007, below I propose its counterpart for 
E/SE Asia. I decided to include the polities extant in 2007, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the basis of Amharic language and culture, both, under imperial and communist rule (Kefale 
2013). 
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roughly speaking, in the quadrant between longitudes 90°E and 
150°E, and latitudes 50°N and 10°S. In order to avoid confusion 
and retain a necessary analytical focus, I decided to exclude from 
the sample Russia, India, Bangladesh and Australia that could 
feature only on the strength of their marginal territories.  
 
For the time being, however, the number of the isomorphic states 
standing at 29 per cent of the region’s all polities, and that of the 
isomorphic and near-isomorphic states at 50 per cent, it appears 
that the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, 
though of high importance, is not the sole norm of nation-state 
building and legitimation in East and Southeast Asia. In the case 
of demography and territory, it is the inclusion of China in the 
group of the non-ethnolinguistic states that does sway the 
balance in the relative ideological favor of non-isomorphic 
nationalisms.  
 
States 
fulfilling 
the 
isomorphis
m 
  
States 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphis
m 
  
Other 
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
Non-
ethnolinguis
tic states 
  
The 
total of 
the 
analyze
d 
polities 
  
Percentag
e of the 
isomorph
ic states 
in the total 
of the 
analyzed 
polities 
Isomorphic 
states and 
the states 
aspiring to 
fulfill the 
isomorphis
m 
combined, 
expressed 
as a 
percentage 
of the total 
of the 
analyzed 
polities 
Cambodia, 
Indonesia, 
Japan, Laos, 
Myanmar, 
Thailand, 
Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
 
[7] 
Malaysia, 
Mongolia, 
North Korea, 
Philippines 
South Korea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[5] 
East Timor, 
Palau, 
Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] 
Brunei, 
China, 
Guam, Hong 
Kong, 
Macau, 
Northern 
Mariana 
Islands, 
Papua New 
Guinea, 
Singapore 
[8] 
24 29% 50% 
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E/SE Asia’s Isomorphic and Other Polities in 2007 
Table 7 
 
However, the situation as presented in the table only looks like 
that through the internationalizing and flattening lens of English. 
On the other hand, for instance, from the official stance 
expressed in Korean, both Koreas do not share the name of 
Korea, or the name of their seemingly shared Korean language. 
In Korean the North Koreans refer to their country and language 
as Chosŏn and Chosŏnmal, respectively, while the South Koreans 
use Daehan and Hangungmal in these roles. In Korean the 
communist and capitalist ‘nations’ mark the difference between 
themselves through this highly emotive ideological terminology. 
 
Ideologically, the situation is similar to East Germany’s efforts to 
overhaul its population into a new socialist nation, separate from 
the capitalist West Germans (cf Kosing 1976: 222-224). But in 
the German language, both the East and the West Germans 
continued to share the same name, Deutsch, for their nations and 
their shared language. On the contrary, at the level of 
terminological difference, both Koreas appear to follow the 
example of Moldova and Romania. The names of the two nation-
states and their nations are different in English and in 
Moldovan/Romanian (Moldova vs România) and their exactly 
same language was constitutionally construed as different, that is 
Romanian (Română) in Romania, and between 1994 and 2013, 
Moldovan (Moldovenească) in Moldova.  
 
Hence, if we take into consideration the logic of naming as a 
reflection of the espousal of the normative isomorphism, both 
Koreas should be classified as fully isomorphic nation-states, 
necessitating their moving to the first (or ‘isomorphic’) rubric in 
Table 7. However, this hypothesis to hold would have to be first 
checked whether it is the way the North Koreans and the South 
Koreans construe themselves and their nation-states. The 
evidence of terminology alone is not sufficient. More research is 
needed on this question. 
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Languages, Scripts 
 
Probing into the ‘genetic’11 classification of the national languages 
in E/SE Asia’s isomorphic polities does not reveal any regularities, 
apart from that that the more distant states in question are from 
one another, the more it is sure that their languages are not 
related.  
 
Altaic 
languages 
Austronesian 
languages 
Austrosiatic 
languages 
Tai-Kadai 
languages 
Sino-
Tibetan 
languages 
Japanese 
 
[1] 
Indonesian 
 
[1] 
Khmer, 
Vietnamese 
[2] 
Laotian, 
Thai 
[2] 
Myanmar 
 
[1] 
E/SE Asia’s Isomorphic Languages and Their ‘Genetic’ 
Classification 
Table 8 
 
A more interesting story can be teased out by probing into the 
scripts of E/SE Asia’s isomorphic languages. As many as six 
different scripts are at present employed for writing and printing 
in these seven isomorphic languages. The contrast with Central 
Europe is staggering, as only the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets are 
used in the case of the region’s isomorphic languages. Both 
European scripts are of the same kind – phonemic – meaning that 
ideally one grapheme (letter) corresponds to one phoneme (the 
smallest sound in a language that can effect a change in the 
meaning of words).  
 
                                                          
11 I put the term ‘genetic’ in quotation marks in order to emphasize its metaphoric meaning. 
The ‘genetic’ classification of languages is that of their similarities as seen through time (or 
diachronically). This type of classification developed under the influence of the Darwinian 
theory of evolution (cf Schleicher 1869). But when living organisms do procreate, languages 
do not, though popularly groups of diachronically similar languages are referred to as 
‘families.’ It is a metaphor taken from biology, not an apt description of the linguistic reality. 
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Brahmi (syllabic) Chinese-Mixed 
(morphemic-
syllabic) 
European 
(phonemic) 
Khmer script, Lao 
script, Myanmar script, 
Thai script 
[4] 
Japanese script Latin (Indonesian, 
Vietnamese) 
 
 
[1] 
E/SE Asia’s Isomorphic Languages and Their Scripts 
Table 9 
 
In the case of E/SE Asia’s isomorphic nation-states, the difference 
between them is not only marked through language, but is also 
reinforced by script, the normative ideal being that each language 
ought to be written in its own specific script. As a result, the 
fourth necessary element of script is added to the normative 
isomorphism as practiced in E/SE Asia. Hence, in this case it may 
be more appropriate to speak of the normative isomorphism of 
language, script, nation and state. 
 
Without Western colonialism, Vietnamese would have been still 
jotted down in Chinese characters, while perhaps a form of the 
Arabic script would have been employed for writing Indonesian. 
Then the E/SE Asian ideal of a separate script for each isomorphic 
language would have been fulfilled. However, it is doubtful that 
without Western colonial and cultural intrusions and impositions 
the concept of the ethnolinguistic nation-state would at all have 
seized the day in E/SE Asia as a leading model of statehood 
organization and legitimation since the mid-20th century. The 
adoption of this isomorphic type of national statehood is a 
defensive reaction to Western imperialism. 
 
Ironically, ethnolinguistic nationalism originated as a similarly 
defensive reaction of the German-speakers in the Holy Roman 
Empire. This polity was dissolved under French pressure in 1806, 
and its German-speaking elite, left with no state to call their own, 
creatively adopted the state-based (and -led) French nationalism. 
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In the process they altered this novel ideology into ethnolinguistic 
nationalism that best suited their predicament of sudden 
statelessness (or rather the division of the German-speaking 
community among a plethora of states). With this freshly-minted 
ideology of German ethnolinguistic nationalism, at the turn of the 
1810s, the elite successfully rallied mass support against the 
relentless eastward expansion of the revolutionary French nation-
state-turned-empire (cf Greenfled 1992: 352-386). 
 
The Brahmi (Indic) scripts of Khmer, Lao, Myanmar and Thai 
show that the territories inhabited by peoples speaking these 
languages used to be part of the Hindu cultural sphere which in 
the past extended from the Indus to Java (Pulvier 1995: map 3). 
(In India, a multitude of Brahmi-derived syllabic scripts are still 
employed for writing and printing in the country’s numerous 
languages [Singh and Banthia 2004: 182-189].) By the same 
token, the use of the Chinese morphemic writing system reflects 
the former extent of China’s political and cultural influence in 
Asia, from Japan and Korea to Vietnam (Hermann 1966: 30-31). 
On the other hand, the use of the Latin alphabet is a recent 
legacy of European imperialism, while the eventually unrealized 
possibility of the Arabic script for Indonesian is a reflection of the 
replacement of Hindu culture by its Islamic counterpart in what 
today is Indonesia and Malaysia between the 13th and 18th 
centuries (Pulvier 1995: map 16). 
 
Nowadays, all the extant scripts go back to the two independent 
instances of the invention of the technology of writing, one in 
Mesopotamia and another in China (the third instance that 
occurred in Mesoamerica was extinguished by European 
colonialism in the 16th century). Indochina is the meeting point of 
the two traditions. The Brahmi-related and European scripts stem 
from the Mesopotamian font of writing (Rogers 2005: 4). The 
Chinese script underlies the tradition of literacy in Japan, though 
nowadays it is interlaced with characters from two locally 
developed syllabaries (Campbell 1997: 76-80). Should both 
Koreas be included in the E/SE group of isomorphic polities, quite 
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appropriately, they also brandish their own distinctive scripts. In 
South Korea, somewhat similarly as in Japan, the Chinese 
morphemic script is used in combination with the locally devised 
phonemic script. In contrast, in 1949, North Korea decided to use 
only the phonemic system, though the policy has not been fully 
consistent since the 1960s (Korean 2014). 
 
 
The Need for Further Research 
 
In this article I presented the analytical instrument of the 
normative isomorphism of language, nation and state for 
detecting and measuring the spread and the state of 
implementation of ethnolinguistic nationalism as an ideology of 
nation-state building, legitimation and maintenance. With the use 
of this instrument, I demonstrated that at present there are two 
clusters of isomorphic nation-states, one located in Central 
Europe and the other in E/SE Asia. Because the latter emerged 
later than the former, I propose that the tenets and political 
know-how of ethnolinguistic nationalism spread from (Central) 
Europe to (E/SE) Asia. 
 
In the second half of the article I identified three potential main 
channels of possible knowledge transfer to E/SE Asia, namely, 
from Germany, France and the Soviet Union. Subsequently, I 
briefly analyzed ethnocultural and political regularities in modern 
E/SE Asia as seen through the lens of the normative isomorphism 
of language, nation and state. It appears that in E/SE Asia, as a 
local variation, the fourth element of script was added to this 
isomorphism, resulting in the normative isomorphism of 
language, script, nation and state. 
 
I trust that the preliminary results of the application of this 
analytical instrument of the normative isomorphism for probing 
into the modern history of E/SE Asia appear to be revelatory, 
especially when a comparison is sustained with the Central 
European cluster of isomorphic polities. Hence, a further, in-depth 
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look into the origins of the E/SE Asian cluster of the isomorphic 
nation-states, and its probable links with its Central European 
counterpart appears quite promising. However, an exercise of this 
kind would require a wide-ranging collaborative research project 
carried out by an interdisciplinary team of scholars. Not a single 
scholar can realistically be expected to achieve a command of 
even the most important languages of E/SE Asia and Central 
Europe and a thorough knowledge of the modern history of the 
two isomorphic clusters’ national polities. 
 
For the time being, by way of comparison, as shown in Table 6, 
the number of the polities fulfilling the normative isomorphism in 
E/SE Asia is half of that in Central Europe. Nevertheless, I wish to 
emphasize, the influence of ethnolinguistic nationalism may be – 
at least, in a long term perspective – much wider in E/SE Asia 
than in Central Europe, because the former region’s isomorphic 
polities house five times more inhabitants than live in Central 
Europe’s isomorphic nation-states. It is a fact to be well borne in 
mind when a justification is necessary to support an application 
for a grant to compare the two regions that might not obviously 
suggest themselves as bedfellows for comparison. The sheer 
distance separating E/SE Asia and Central Europe, to the tune of 
10,000 to 14,000 kilometers, is not conducive for undertaking 
such comparative projects, either. I will be glad then, should my 
article convince some scholars that a comparison of this type may 
be yet a rewardingly novel and engrossing path of 
interdisciplinary and multilingual enquiry, well worth embarking 
on. 
 
June-July 2014 
Cill Rìmhinn / Saunt Aundraes 
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